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Executive Summary
We show that business cycles can emerge and proliferate endogenously
in the economy due to the way economic agents learn, form their
expectations, and make decisions regarding savings and production
for future periods. There are no exogenous shocks of any kind to
productivity or any other fundamental parameters of the economy, in
contrast to Real Business Cycle models. To our knowledge this thesis is
the first attempt to formally introduce adaptive learning and expectation
errors as an autonomous source of endogenous business cycles.
We develop a simple, growth-less macroeconomic model, in which
agents do not have perfect foresight, learn adaptively to form expec-
tations, and solve limited inter-temporal optimization models. The
theoretical possibility of cycles largely arises from the nonlinearity of
the actual law of motion of price, in particular from the fact that agents
always overpredict (underpredict) future prices when they are higher
(lower) than equilibrium level. Even though the main version of the
model is based on households having a simple logarithmic utility func-
tion, we also show that the results hold when a more generic Hyperbolic
Absolute Risk Aversion utility function is chosen. Money stock is neutral
in the long run in either case.
We conduct simulations in models with agents having both simple
logarithmic and HARA utility functions. Following Thomas Sargent
(1993), we assume agents to be “rational econometricians” using various
econometric adaptive learning tools: Auto ARIMA, VAR and AR(2)
models. In all simulations, output and other economic variables indeed
display cyclical fluctuations around their equilibrium levels.
Both converging and diverging cycles may be obtained in simula-
iii
iv
tions with Auto ARIMA models, while the VAR learning tool leads to
diverging fluctuations in the majority of cases, suggesting that making
agents consider several variables increases instability, at least in our
setting. It is also observed that higher frequency of model switching is
usually accompanied with increasing amplitude of cycles, suggesting
the hypothesis that economic crises may happen when agents make
drastic revisions of their beliefs about how the economy works. Only
converging cycles can be obtained with AR(2), however in this case
the economy may get trapped in a so called “false equilibrium”, with
output way below or above the true equilibrium level. Even though this
is not formally an equilibrium, the convergence towards the true one
is so slow that exogenous shocks may be needed to move the economy
back on track. This result is in line with the Keynesian view that the
economy may remain in a depressed state for quite a long period of
time, and active government intervention may be required to speed up
the recovery.
Within the developed framework we analyze whether active mone-
tary policy (i.e. changes in money stock) can be used for stabilization
purposes. It turns out that in the simple case, when agents have loga-
rithmic utility function, shifts in money supply can have real effects on
the economy only if they are unexpected by agents, or if future price
expectations are not adjusted exactly proportionally to the announced
monetary interventions. We also show that the second case is not sus-
tainable within the adaptive learning environment, so that monetary
policy may become ineffective in the long run when, and if, learning is
complete.
We prove, however, that monetary interventions always have real
effects in the short run in the setting with a more generic HARA utility
function. Still, it is highly questionable whether the central bank is able
to accurately assess the consequences of its own actions, as that would
require it knowing precisely the actual law of motion of the economy,
current market’s expectations, and agents’ reaction to news about the
upcoming monetary interventions, which, moreover, can change over
time.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
“Prosperity ends in a crisis. The error of optimism dies in the
crisis, but in dying it gives birth to an error of pessimism. This
new error is born, not an infant, but a giant; for an industrial
boom has necessarily been a period of strong emotional excite-
ment, and an excited man passes from one form of excitement
to another more rapidly than he passes to quiescence. Under
the new error, business is unduly depressed.”
Arthur Cecil Pigou1
Is the business cycle an optimal response to exogenous fluctuations of
fundamental parameters of the economy? Or is it the consequence of a
series of market imperfections, such as price or wage stickiness?
When it comes to explaining business cycles, even though it is rea-
sonable to think that both approaches of current mainstream economics
carry some truth with them, still the above suggested interpretations
seem to leave us with a rather vague feeling of dissatisfaction, even
when presented in combination. In particular, while it is certainly true
that the structure of the economy has an effect on the fluctuation of
its own output, we argue not only that this is not the whole story, but
most importantly that it is not even the main story. In fact, the above
1Pigou, Arthur C. (1927) Industrial Fluctuations, Macmillan.
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quotation describes very well the central idea behind this work: the
belief that it is the way people look at the future and learn from the past
that shapes their decisions in such a way that allows cycles to emerge.
It is a general fact that the future consequences of our present
decisions depend on a large set of factors; we all know it and this is why
we all try to predict the most likely future states while making present
choices. However, in the last few decades, the literature in economics
has given increasing importance to the structural side of the economy,
seemingly leaving behind the empirical study on how individuals form
their expectations for the future, as well as the theoretical study on how
this factor affects the functioning of the economy. To a large extent, this
kind of problem was taken away in the sake of determinacy, particularly
with the aid of the so-called rational expectations revolution.
Taking away this problem has indeed solved major formal issues.
However, we argue that it might have been a well-hidden source of
substantial difficulties, such as those contemporaneous scholars seem to
have in explaining and consequently predicting economic fluctuations.
For this reason, the present work is our first attempt to renew the
awareness about the fundamental role of expectations in our economic
system, particularly concerning the business cycles.
The idea that expectations may play a central role in causing eco-
nomic fluctuations is, of course, not new, and was probably first explicitly
suggested by Pigou (1927), later evolving into the notion of ‘animal
spirits’ in Keynes’s General Theory. However, to our knowledge, this
idea remained exclusively qualitative during that period, and no formal
model was built to describe how expectations are actually formed and
evolve over time.
The rational expectations revolution, while causing the rapid ad-
vancement of sophisticated models, guaranteed hard times to anybody
willing to study endogenous fluctuations, and eventually led to the
development of the Real Business Cycles (RBC) theory. It seems that
after the introduction of RBC, economists focused all their attention on
extending Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models to
improve their fit to the observed data, usually through implementing
3various rigidities and imperfections. Most importantly, being busy with
polishing RBC models, economists seemed to forget the possibility that
the economy may experience business cycles without any shocks to
fundamentals, or, actually, without any shocks at all. Our motivation is
to demonstrate exactly that.
The starting point of our journey is to diverge from DSGE modeling.
Acknowledging that rational expectations are in fact an equilibrium
computational concept (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) that need not
necessarily correctly represent the dynamics of the real economy, we
aimed, following Sargent (1993), to inhabit our theoretical model with
human beings and switch off the ‘God mode’ explicitly present in every
DSGE model. We should also stress, however, that we did not end up
in some kind of agent-based modeling, another extreme, and built a
simple, compact and solvable macroeconomic model.
The remaining of this work is structured as follows: in chapter 2
we review some of the most relevant contributions in the theory of
business cycles, contextualizing our work within them; in chapter 3 we
describe and solve our model; chapter 4 is reserved to the presentation
of simulations, together with a discussion on their outcomes; in chapter
5 we introduce and apply methods for the analysis of the limiting
behavior of the economy; in chapter 6 we develop a discussion on the
effectiveness of monetary policy within our setting; finally, chapter 7
concludes.
Chapter 2
REVIEW OF BUSINESS CYCLE
THEORIES
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of
the history of business cycle theory; however, a comprehensive and
exhaustive survey of the topic would easily require an entire book, and
it is therefore outside of our purposes. Instead, we will introduce few
selected theories, reserving particular emphasis to the positioning of
our work within the literature, so to underline the relevance of our
contribution.
2.1 Theories from the 19th Century
Business cycles did not receive particular attention from the classical
economists of the 19th century such as Smith, Say or Ricardo, who firmly
believed in the ability of the capitalistic economy to naturally gravitate
towards a state of equilibrium and, in absence of exogenous shocks, to
remain in such state once it has been reached. Mainstream economics
regarded fluctuations in the economy as a fact of secondary importance,
bound to disappear in the long-run. Following this line of thought,
classical economists focused their analysis on the long run behavior of
the economy and on the identification of its so-called natural state of
equilibrium.
Say’s law of market is arguably one of the results that most closely
4
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expresses the view of the mainstream of that time. According to Say
(1803), there is no possibility of aggregate overproduction because
agents use the income obtained from selling produced goods for con-
sumption; or in other words, supply is the source of its own demand.
As a direct implication, note that, since underconsumption is in princi-
ple impossible, every theory of crises based on such a thing should be
regarded as inexact.
In light of these considerations, it is perhaps not surprising that,
to find the first theories of cycles, one has to look at the heterodox
economics of the period; more precisely, the very first and yet still
partial and unstructured treatment of fluctuations can be found in
Sismondi (1819). In his book Nouveaux Principes d’Economie Politique,
Sismondi suggests a crisis theory based on overproduction, where crises
are presented as a direct consequence of the complexity and the lack of
centralized planning inherent to the capitalistic economy. As Mitchell
(1927) effectively summarizes, Sismondi introduces at least four major
arguments in favor of the possibility of crises in the capitalistic economy.
From our perspective, we should note that one of these arguments is
built on the belief in the presence of a economy-wide coordination
problem. In particular, Sismondi observes that firms in the market face
a complex and heterogenous mass of consumers, whose characteristics
quite often remain unknown to the firms themselves. In fact, firms are
ultimately left with market price as the only observable variable to use
as a guide in their production decisions. According to Sismondi, this lack
of information on the characteristics of consumers (and competitors) is
a potential source of non-optimality in the production decisions, that
can generate booms and crises over time.
It is important to stress the role of price expectations in Sismondi’s
explanation of crises. To use Richard Hyse’s words:
“Sismondi starts with the basic assumption that the ease of
consumption this year - whether the output was sold at expected
prices - is the basis for production decisions for the next year in
the same way that ease of consumption last year determined
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the production decisions of this year.”1
In this sense, one could claim that arguments in the same spirit of
the one on which our theory is built, have been suggested since the
beginnings of the 19th century. However, at the same time one should
note that, while Sismondi’s intuition on the effect of expectations on
economic activity was certainly brilliant for his time, nonetheless his
analysis remained purely qualitative, reducing most of the times to sim-
ple postulations rather than logical or mathematical derivations, leaving
space to unclear dynamics between expectations and the occurrence of
crises.
In spite of the theory in Sismondi (1819), this type of planning and
coordination problem was rather overlooked by the literature, which
instead gave more space to purely underconsumptionist theories such
as that of Malthus (1836). At the same time, in the mainstream the
conviction remained strong that crises could arise only in response to
exogenous shocks. For instance, Ricardo (1817) recognizes the possi-
bility of crises and overproduction in spite of the obvious contradiction
with the law of market. In fact, Ricardo overcomes this apparent incon-
sistency by considering the possibility of exogenous events (e.g. wars),
which could change the natural state of the economy, forcing it into a
period of adaptation. During this period, whose length varies accord-
ing to the level of capital and labor specialization in the country, the
economy (or at least some sectors of it) is expected to face a crisis.
It is clear that Ricardo’s theory does not leave space for endogenously
generated crises in the capitalistic economy, but again this should not
come as a surprise. As long as we believe in the existence of a state
in which the economic system is somehow naturally bound to remain,
finding arguments in favor of endogenous fluctuations that do not come
at the expense of consistency is probably better described as an art,
rather than a science. In fact, in this respect, one could argue that
Ricardo laid out the fundamental idea on which, after more than a
1J. C. Sismonde Di Sismondi (1991) New Principles of Political Economy: Of Wealth
and Its Relation to Population (R. Hyse, Trans. and Ed.) Transaction Publishers.
(Original work published 1819.)
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century, Kydland and Prescott (1982) build their Real Business Cycle
Theory, i.e. cycles are the result of optimal responses to exogenous
shocks to economic fundamentals. However, let us leave a detailed
treatment of this theory and its extensions for section 2.5.
So far, we have reviewed theories of crisis elaborated at best under
the acknowledgement that the capitalistic economy can indeed experi-
ence periods of severe recession over time. However, note that in the
literature there was little awareness of the so-called cyclical behavior of
the economy. In fact, once we leave the domain of crisis theory, the first
structured treatise on the business cycle is found in Juglar (1862). Not
only Juglar is among the first to acknowledge the presence of irregular
fluctuations in the economy, but he also tries to provide an endogenous
explanation of this phenomenon, in contrast to Ricardo’s position. He
suggests a theory of cycles based on over-investment and excessive con-
fidence, where he divides the cycle into three phases: prosperity, crisis
and liquidation.
Juglar’s cycle theory is particularly relevant to the present work
because of the central role of agents’ confidence in it; and even though
the way this confidence is built and destroyed seems to remain a rather
intuitive idea for Juglar, it is clear that expectations, seen as a powerful
investment driver, play a primary role in boosting the prosperity phase
of the economy and in triggering the fall of it once the crisis phase is
approached.
Most importantly, Juglar was probably the first, but not the last, to
theorize on the presence of a structural relationship between individuals’
confidence and aggregate investment. In fact, as we will see in section
2.2 and 2.3, this concept was reiterated by distinguished authors such
as Pigou (1927) and Keynes (1936). Moreover, with this respect, even
though the dynamics of capital markets are not fully treated in our theory,
in section 3.3 we will observe how, under basic assumptions, savings
behave as a function of agents’ confidence expressed as expectations on
next period prices.
However, let us now move to the 20th century and use the following
sections to examine some of the main business cycle theories developed
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by the major schools of the century.
2.2 Neoclassical Economics
A first broad classification of neoclassical business cycle theories can be
done by differentiating between monetary and real approaches. While
the former strive to attribute the presence of fluctuations in GDP to
purely nominal factors (e.g. the elasticity of money supply), the latter
find explanations of cycles in the fundamental structure of the economy
and in the dynamics of agents’ behavior. In this section, we are going
to review examples of each type, but let us start by introducing some
common factors for most neoclassical theories.
Over-investment is one of the most commonly accepted theoretical
explanations of the business cycle among neoclassical economists; a
typical framework would be to consider an economy with two sectors,
one producing capital goods and the other producing consumer goods.
It is a well known empirical fact2 that the sensitivity of investment to the
business cycle is significantly higher than that of consumption; in other
words, the capital goods sector tends to grow quickly during periods
of prosperity and to fall sharply during crises, while the activity of the
consumer goods sector follows a smoother path across the phases of
the cycle. According to this neoclassical over-investment framework,
this empirical fact is evidence of serious imbalances in the development
of the two sectors over time. The general concept is that in periods
of prosperity the capital goods sector becomes over-developed relative
to the consumer goods sector; this imbalance is not sustainable over
time and the result is the beginning of a period of adjustment, causing
a downturn in the economy. The disagreements usually come as to
the reason why such over-investment arises and whether it is a natural
feature of the economy, perhaps even beneficial in the long-run, or not.
According to the Austrian Business Cycle Theory, particularly as ex-
posed by Mises (1912) and Hayek (1931), the cause of over-investment
has to be found in the central bank’s inflationary monetary policy. Indeed
2See e.g. Hansen (1985) and Prescott (1986) for empirical evidence.
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such a policy, characterized by a high monetary base, generally tends to
increase the overall money supply, ultimately raising the availability of
credit. As the supply of credit is high, ceteris paribus, the interest rate
(i.e. the price of credit) is low and investment is incentivized. Moreover,
because of the artificially low interest rate, entrepreneurs tend to under-
take a relatively higher number of long-term projects, normally located
into the capital goods sector. In fact, as they now tend to discount
the future income stream from all projects with low interest rates, the
apparent relative profitability of longer projects increases. That is, artifi-
cially low interest rates modify the absolute and relative valuations of
projects by entrepreneurs, causing an increase in investment particularly
in the capital goods sector. However, in the Austrians’ view, the equilib-
rium interest rate is ultimately determined by people’s time preferences,
i.e. by their current decision between consumption and savings. Such
preferences are a fundamental of the economic system and they are
not altered by monetary policies. Thus, once the excessive supply of
money shifts from indebted firms to people (through wages, rent and
interests), the latter start to reestablish the equilibrium allocation of
their income, decreasing savings and increasing consumption. This is
when the unsustainability of the previous level of investment becomes
clear and the economy experiences a downturn.
We shall note that the Austrian school’s explanation of the business
cycle has a marked flavor of exogeneity, as it is clear that this theory
is built upon the belief that the economy would stabilize in absence of
external shocks. Consistently with this point, the Austrians conclude
that most of (if not all) external interventions should be avoided to
ensure the stability and the efficiency of the economy.
One can find a remarkably diverging theory of over-investment in
Schumpeter (1912, 1939), who interprets the business cycle as a un-
avoidable process that is intrinsically linked to economic growth. In
Schumpeter’s approach, business cycles represent the necessary adjust-
ments for the economy to move from one static equilibrium to a new one,
characterized by higher output per capita. The engine of growth and
the trigger factor of fluctuations are both identified in the innovational
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activity of entrepreneurs, which is experienced in a wave-like form, as
a few innovators are enough to prompt the herd behavior of followers.
That is, innovations tend to come in clusters, laying the foundations for
the manifestation of cycles. In fact, they push the economic system far
away from the neighborhood of equilibrium, triggering the spontaneous
reaction of agents, that drives the economy toward its new natural state.
However, this adjustment is neither immediate nor immediately exact,
as the economy is likely to overshoot, missing the new equilibrium in
both directions multiple times and experiencing several fluctuations
before reaching a new stability.
While it is evident that innovation represents the core of Schum-
peter’s explanation of cycles, focusing on a more marginal aspect of
this theory, the careful reader might even note similarities between the
endogenous process of adjustment described above and the dynamics
of the model that will be introduced in chapter 3. Obviously, we do not
intend to go as far as suggesting an expectations-based view of cycles in
Schumpeter’s analysis, as that would simply be misleading. However,
there seems to be an acknowledgement that as soon as the economy is
moved out of the equilibrium, the adjustment process that follows is
rather lengthy and complicated, leading to errors of both signs. In this
respect, the main difference between the argument in Schumpeter and
the one in the present work is that, while the former claims that in ab-
sence of ‘shocks’ (e.g. waves of innovation) the economy will eventually
reach its equilibrium, we argue that in fact this is not necessarily the
case.
The fundamental idea upon which we build this latter assertion as
well as the core of our theoretical work is probably best identified in
the theory of the English neoclassical economist Arthur C. Pigou. In
particular, the analysis of Pigou (1927) emphasizes for the first time the
role of agents’ expectations as the main factor through which cycles are
generated. The basic idea works as follows: businessmen (i.e. firms)
need to form some expectations on the future state of the economy so to
take decisions regarding both their short-run operations and long-term
investments. The economic system is complex, the state of the market is
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dynamically and discontinuously changing over time, and since firms
have only a limited amount of information, their predictions are likely
to be wrong. More precisely, according to Pigou, such predictions are
going to be wrong systemically in the same direction because of the
contagious nature of business opinion and the strong interdependencies
among firms; i.e. not only errors do not cancel out at the aggregate
level, but the mistakes of a few agents can influence the predictions of
the majority if, for instance, those agents are believed to possess the
best information.
Given the limited set of information available to agents, expectations
are likely to be driven by what Pigou calls impulses. One can see
these impulses as the discovery of new information or the occurrence of
particular real, monetary, or even psychological circumstances. However,
while they certainly play an important role in Pigou’s pluralistic business
cycle theory, it would be wrong to consider impulses as the essential
prerequisite for fluctuations. In fact, the interpretation of expectations
as an autonomously destabilizing process is characteristic of Pigou’s
thought. The idea that the economy can easily and quickly move from
one period of great over-optimism to one of strong over-pessimism is
clearly presented as a primary source of cycles.
Building on Pigou’s theoretical work, in chapter 3 we are going to
formalize the role of expectations in a simple model. We will provide
evidence in favor of the fact that the dynamics of expectations alone can
indeed be a sufficient element for fluctuations to arise and proliferate
in the economy. More precisely, as long as the agents do not know
exactly the structure and the dynamics of the system, the way they
form their expectations and make their decisions can generate persistent
fluctuations even while keeping constant the fundamentals and the
equilibrium level of a simple economy, i.e. without the introduction of
any impulse.
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2.3 Keynesian Economics
In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes sug-
gests a theory of the business cycle based both on psychology and
short-term economic analysis. According to Keynes, in the short-run,
it is aggregate effective demand that determines the level of income,
output and employment, and it is because of changes in aggregate de-
mand that cycles occur. As aggregate demand consists of consumption
and investment, it is the latter that is considered the primary factor
responsible for the occurrence of fluctuations.
Investment is a function of the interest rate and the expected rate
of return on capital, or, in Keynes’ words, ‘the marginal efficiency of
capital’. Particular attention is reserved to this latter variable, which is
supposed to be subject to cyclical and sudden variations.
The fundamental idea is that one cannot explain investment decisions
using theories of rational choice. More specifically, there seems to be no
reason to assume that agents will form their expectations on the rate of
return of capital in a rational way. The implication is that most of the
times expectations will not be correct and will generate instability. In
Keynes’ words:
“Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there
is the instability due to the characteristic of human nature
that a large proportion of our positive activities depend on
spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical expectations,
whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of
our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences
of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only
be taken as the result of animal spirits – a spontaneous urge
to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a
weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quanti-
tative probabilities.”3
That is, Keynes’s observation is that there is a set of psychological
3Keynes, John M. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,
Macmillan, London, pp.161-162
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factors, what he calls ‘animal spirits’, that drives human behavior, re-
sulting in systematic irrational decision-making. Most importantly we
shall note that, even though it would probably be imprecise to reduce
the whole concept of animal spirits to the only dynamics of expectations
formation, that is certainly one way through which it is supposed to
influence the economic outcome.
Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that not only Keynes un-
derlines the irrelevance of mathematical expectations in the dynamics
of agents’ behavior, but he also seems to suggest a rather unstructured
and instinctive approach characterizing the methods of expectations
formation. In comparison with this observation, our setup in chapter 4
will introduce a compromising view, where agents are assumed to act
as rational econometricians, being unaware of the exact structure of
the economy they live in and yet trying to forecast future prices with
rational approaches, given the limited set of information they dispose
of.
While we shall avoid digging further into the technical details of the
Keynesian cycle, it is important to mention that, building on The General
Theory, the so-called neo-Keynesian school suggested new explanations
of the business cycle for the most part using only crude theories of
investment. In particular, the interested reader can find illustrious
examples in several versions of the multiplier-accelerator model such as
in Samuelson (1939) and Hicks (1950).
However, the peculiarity of the neo-Keynesian approach is that, while
paying particular attention to the development of an effective neo-
classical synthesis of Keynes’s theory, it seems to forget the psychological
part of it, which nonetheless plays a major role in the original approach.
This, we argue, comes at a considerable loss of explanatory power.
Fortunately, as we will have occasion to note in section 2.6, this gap has
recently started to be filled by some authors from the new Keynesian
camp, as well as the behavioral field. In fact, the present work serves
also as our first effort in that direction.
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2.4 New Classical Economics
New classical economics was developed starting from the 1970s as an
alternative to the Keynesian approach. This theory is strongly character-
ized by its insistence on the importance of providing solid microfoun-
dations as the basis for macroeconomic results. To do so, new classical
economists introduce two fundamental assumptions in their models.
First, all agents are optimizers; i.e. given a set of variables that they
observe (e.g. prices, wages, interest rate, etc.), individuals make the
best possible decision for their own interest. Second, all agents forecast
the future using rational expectations.
From the technical point of view, the assumption of rational expec-
tations, first introduced by Muth (1961), provides economic theorists
with a powerful modeling tool, bringing the art of making formal predic-
tions to a whole new level. However, we shall note, the use of rational
expectations cannot be reduced to a mere technical expedient. In fact,
from a theoretical point of view, it consists of a strong assumption on
the behavior of individuals, which, as we know, is at the very basis of
any economic system. Thus, we argue, one should be extremely care-
ful about the implications of such an assumption within each specific
settings, before claiming in favor of the generality of obtained results.4
However, this problematic has not stopped new classical authors from
applying rational expectations to economic modeling, sometimes even
with interesting and certainly famous results. An illustrious example
can be found in Lucas (1976), whose critique undermines the validity of
policy advice derived from large-scale macroeconometric models, such
as those in the original Keynesian tradition. In fact, Lucas observes that
the structure of an econometric model is the result of optimal decision
rules of economic agents, but such decision rules are a multivariate
function of several variables, including those factors through which
economic policies are usually implemented, e.g. the money supply.
Thus, if we change one or more of such variables, predictions based on
4The interested reader can refer to Sargent (1993) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2001, 2009) for a thorough analysis on the possibility to justify rational expectations
as the limiting behavior of agents within an adaptive learning environment.
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the assumption of constant decision rules, will reveal wrong.
Furthermore, following the well-known Lucas (1972)’s result on the
neutrality of money, Sargent and Wallace (1975) develop the so-called
‘policy ineffectiveness proposition’. According to this proposition, if
public authorities try to use deterministic economic policies aimed at
having countercyclical effects, the result will be an increased amount
of noise in the economy without any effect on its average performance.
That is to say, the central bank cannot systemically and effectively use
monetary policy to boost employment and output. Thus, note that if
the policy ineffectiveness proposition actually did hold in reality, then
the role of central banks as economic stabilizers would be extremely
reduced.
In fact, to provide further evidence on this matter, in chapter 6 we
use our model to investigate the validity of the money neutrality result
as in Lucas (1972). We will show that money neutrality holds only
in the long run, while in the short term its validity is neither obvious
nor general outside the rational expectations framework. This, in turn,
seems to leave reasonable space for the exploitation of monetary policy.
In terms of pure cycle theory, the main new classical contribution has
been the development of the equilibrium business cycle theory (EBCT),
whose key and innovative aspect is the interpretation of the business
cycle as an equilibrium phenomenon, rather than a disequilibrium event.
Clearly, as it was already mentioned in section 2.1, there is at least an
intuitive contrast between the concept of equilibrium and that of fluctu-
ation, which makes the building of equilibrium models of endogenous
business cycles a rather difficult task, particularly in (almost) perfect
foresight settings such as those characterized by rational expectations.
As a consequence of the technical difficulty to generating equilibrium
models of endogenous fluctuations, new classical economists have intro-
duced different kinds of exogenous shocks into their artificial economies.
Shocks to aggregate demand usually consist of unexpected changes in
monetary or fiscal policy such as those in Lucas (1973, 1975), Barro
(1980) and Brunner et al. (1983). Shocks to the supply side typically
consist of exogenous variations in productivity and are at the base of
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the Real Business Cycle Theory (RBCT).
2.5 Real Business Cycle Theory
Real business cycle models, as first developed by Kydland and Prescott
(1982), are characterized by the introduction of technological shocks
as the main source of fluctuations within an otherwise stable dynamic
general equilibrium economy. Proponents of the RBCT5 oppose the view
that monetary factors and eventual market failures have a decisive role
in the determination of the business cycle.
In particular, in its most striking result, RBCT implies that fluctua-
tions are not caused by any kind of market failure; instead, they are the
consequence of optimal responses to exogenous shocks to real variables.
That is, conditional on different realizations of the technology parame-
ter, crises and booms become simply desirable events, during which the
economy holds a constrained Pareto-efficient allocation of resources.
A direct implication of this result is that a policy of laissez-faire
is in fact the optimal outcome in terms of the typical expected total
welfare maximization problem. However, we shall note, not only this
conclusion seems highly counterintuitive, but it also appears rather
unsatisfying from the perspective of public authorities. This is the case
in the sense that the government and the central bank are pronounced,
at best, completely ineffective against the mighty power of random
shocks, especially in view of the extremely high level of sophistication
characterizing all the individuals in the economy.6
In fact, even if one was willing to blindly accept the belief that
the fundamental source of fluctuations is indeed a series of exogenous
technological shocks, we argue, it is the presence of such extremely
sophisticated individuals, introduced through the rational expectations
5The seminal references include, among others, Black (1982); Long and Plosser
(1983); and Prescott (1986).
6Let us clarify this point further for the skeptical reader. Given any empirically
observed state of the economy, ceteris paribus, the government and the central bank
would clearly prefer (i) that such a state was not pareto-optimal and (ii) that they were
able to affect it, so that a superior state could be achieved. In this sense the RBCT’s
result is highly unsatisfying for public authorities.
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hypothesis (REH), that remains the strongest, most controversial and
yet probably the most tolerated feature of RBC models. Indeed, it is
essentially only thanks to the REH that one can argue in favor of such
an outstanding efficiency of free markets, ruling out any possibility of
beneficial external intervention.
Furthermore, we shall also note that, for RBC models to properly
match empirical observations, they have to rely on large and persistent
shocks, which in turn are not explainable on empirical grounds. This
issue is clearly exposed in the analysis of Cogley and Nason (1995),
who show that standard RBC models are characterized by weak internal
propagation mechanisms. In fact, they observe that the persistence
of fluctuations in this kind of models is almost exclusively due to the
Solow residual, which is basically an exogenous component. However,
in response to this kind of criticism, there have been several attempts
of finding better propagation mechanisms, for instance by introducing
labor market frictions such as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996).
2.6 Recent Developments
Recent extensions of baseline RBC models have found an interesting
solution to the critique of Cogley and Nason (1995) by considering the
introduction of adaptive learning. In this kind of work, the empirical
fit of a standard RBC model with rational expectations is usually com-
pared to that of an identical model with adaptive learning. Cellarier
(2008) and Huang et al. (2009), among others, provide clear evidence
in favor of a better fit for the latter case; that is to say, the introduction
of a learning environment seems to strengthen the internal propaga-
tion mechanisms of standard RBC models, significantly improving their
empirical performance.
It would appear that one can find similar results by moving even
further away from the REH, with the introduction of structural learning.
In this case, the additional assumption is that agents have no more than
an incomplete model of the economy, and they try to estimate unknown
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structural features by using historical data. Williams (2003) and Eu-
sepi and Preston (2011) follow this kind of approach, documenting an
even greater effect of adaptive learning as an endogenous source of
fluctuations, compared to more standard learning environments.7
From a somewhat different perspective, Milani (2011) makes use of
available survey data on economic expectations, together with a small
scale new Keynesian model, to provide empirical evidence on the role
of expectations as drivers of the business cycle. His analysis seems to
confirm the importance of unexplained expectation shocks, interpreted
as waves of undue optimism and pessimism, in explaining economic
fluctuations. Theoretically, a similar result is obtained by Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2007), who examine behavioral theories within a standard
growth model, finding that expectation shocks tend to increase the
volatility of cycles in their artificial economy.
Some have even tried to maintain the REH, while adding other ex-
ogenous impulses to the traditional technological shock. For instance,
Beaudry and Portier (2004) introduce exogenous imperfect information
signals that allow their economy to experience recessions even in ab-
sence of technological regress. Nonetheless, the unconvincing aspect of
this approach remains its essential reliance on exogenous factors.
In the last few decades there have also been remarkable develop-
ments in the literature on sunspot equilibria (cf. Woodford, 1990; Howitt
and McAfee, 1992; and Benhabib and Farmer, 1999) and in that on self-
fulfilling expectations (cf. Grandmont, 1985; and Wen, 2001).8 With
respect of their approach, these two strands of literature are somewhat
similar in that they both attempt to explain business cycles by relying
on the existence of equilibria in which expectations drive individuals’
behavior in a way that causes those same expectations to be fulfilled. In
some cases (e.g. Farmer and Guo, 1994) this kind of approach has even
been motivated in view of Pigou’s theory of over-optimism and over-
pessimism, as well as the Keynesian concept of animal spirits. However,
we argue, this interpretation is rather misleading as it misses the point
7Nonetheless, even in structural learning frameworks as those mentioned above,
the technological shock is maintained as the fundamental source of instability.
8In fact it is not unusual to see these two literatures overlapping with each other.
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that it seems to be the erroneous nature of people’s expectations that
drives business cycles according to both such theories.
Finally, we shall mention the presence of a rather young litera-
ture making use of agent-based modeling (cf. Paul, 2003; Dosi et al.,
2006; and Lengnick, 2011). Agent-based models allow the treatment of
extremely complex economies, generally with a large set of heteroge-
nous agents and events that take place with different periodicity. This
economies are usually claimed to be very realistic, and even though
one cannot mathematically solve such complicated models, it is possible
to obtain interesting output by running simulations. On the one hand,
these models seem to show that it is indeed possible for a real economy
to experience purely endogenous business cycles; but on the other hand,
agent-based models are so complicated that one cannot really identify
the dynamics behind their fluctuations.
In fact, in spite of the remarkable research effort in this area, to our
knowledge, so far, nobody has ever developed a model of disequilib-
rium business cycles that is simple enough to be formally analyzed and
properly understood (i.e. diverging from the agent-based approach),
and that can generate persistent fluctuations without having to resort
to any exogenous element. This, in fact, is the purpose of the following
chapter.
Chapter 3
MODEL
3.1 Setup
Here we describe a very simple model of growth-less economy with N
identical firms andH identical households. Firms produce homogeneous
output that is used both as consumer and capital good. There is constant
money stockM in the economy, and velocity of money is 1, so it holds
that YtPt = M . Firms use two production factors: capital and labor. In
each period, capital, which equals real investments from the previous
period, is being fully utilized. Firms plan their output and employment
at the beginning of every period, and then stick to their decisions.
Each period one household disposes of M/H in cash, which is the
sum of its labor income and savings from the previous period, implying:
M = HSt 1 + wtNLt (3.1)
where wt is nominal wage and Lt is employment per firm in period t.
Thus, because of this restriction, there is a negative relation between
employment and nominal wage. While seemingly counterintuitive, this
result does not constitute a problem. Because of the minimal number
of moving parts in the model, correlations and dependencies between
existing variables are illustratively much higher than in real economy.
Since higher employment leads to higher output and lower price, it
makes perfect sense for the nominal wage to go down, following the
20
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Firms decide on
production Qt and
employment Lt given
P et and Kt; wage
wt is determined
Price Pt is
determined
Agents observe
Pt and form
expectation P et+1
Households
decide on savings
St and consume
rest of income
Firms invest what
households save
Figure 3.1: Timeline in Period t
price level.
There is no nominal interest rate in the economy. Still, households
save part of their nominal income from various considerations, and
each period they are kind enough to borrow their savings for firms to
make investments. We assume that firms do not decide over capital
and passively invest what households save.1 This also ensures that the
amount of moneyM is spent to purchase aggregate output. Since firms’
cash inflow and outflow in each period equal exactlyM , their retained
profits are 0.
Figure 3.1 shows the timing of events in the model for each period t.
First, each firm plans its production Qt and decides on how much labor
Lt it will employ given the available amount of capital (real savings
from previous period per firm: Kt = HSt 1NPt 1 ) and current wage (deter-
mined simultaneously). We assume that aggregate labor demand never
exceeds labor supply, so that firms can always hire the desired amount
of labor. Next, price in period t is determined from the quantity equa-
tion of money: Pt = MYt with Yt = NQt. Households and firms observe
Pt and form their expectation of Pt+1.2 Having price expectations in
place, households decide on how to split their nominal income between
consumption and saving. Firms passively invest what households save,
1While this is obviously a strong assumption for any particular firm, it makes sense
at the macro level, especially in a interest rate free environment.
2In this simple model we explicitly assume that households and firms have the
same expectations.
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i.e. buy the good produced in the economy to use it as capital in the
next period.
Having described the timing, we proceed by expressing and solving
mathematically firms’ and households’ problems, assuming particular
functional forms of the utility and production functions.
3.2 Firms and Economy Output
We assume that firms are price takers, i.e. they perceive themselves to be
too small to influence market price with output. Furthermore, firms are
assumed to have Cobb-Douglas production function, with technology A
being constant over time.
Therefore, each firm’s maximization problem at the beginning of
period t is:
max
Lt
n
P et AK
↵
t L
 
t   wtLt
o
. (3.2)
One important remark should be made regarding this maximization
problem. In particular, note that firms are maximizing their nominal
income rather than the real one; moreover, expected price, which repre-
sents also the expected aggregate price level, enters the same problem
that is solved to make decisions regarding real employment and output.
Nonetheless, even though these properties may seem to contradict the
widespread view that an increase in the general price level should not
stimulate firms to produce more, as their real profits do not change,
the specification in (3.2) is not problematic in this sense. Think of a
firm, that perceives itself to be too small to alter price or wage by its
decisions, making plans for the next period. The only thing that this firm
can do is to maximize its nominal profit, as it automatically maximizes
its real profit under given wage and expected price levels. To see that,
divide (3.2) by P et to obtain the equivalent maximization problem in
real terms:
max
Lt
⇢
AK↵t L
 
t  
wt
P et
Lt
 
,
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where wtP et is nothing else than expected real wage. The first order
condition yields an expression for the firm’s decision Lt:
Lt =
✓
 P et AK
↵
t
wt
◆ 1
1  
. (3.3)
So, each firm would be willing to hire more when wage is lower,
expected price is higher, and the firm has larger capital stock, which
increases the marginal productivity of labor
Since the nominal constraint (3.1) should be satisfied, we can substi-
tute (3.3) into (3.1) and solve for nominal wage:
wt =
✓
N
M  HSt 1
◆ 1  
 
( P et AK
↵
t )
1
  . (3.4)
Quite naturally, nominal wage positively depends on expected price
level and available capital. Combining (3.3) and (3.4) we can get an
expression for the actual amount of labor that each firm will hire:
Lt =
✓
M  HSt 1
N P et AK
↵
t
◆ 1
 
. (3.5)
Strikingly, after the elimination of nominal wage, hired amount labor
now depends negatively on expected price and available capital! This
has quite a straightforward explanation, however: when price expecta-
tions and capital increase, the negative effect of wage on employment
obviously surpasses the expected revenue benefit. To clarify this point
even further, note that obviously firms still make decisions using (3.3).
Instead, equation (3.5) should be regarded as the macroeconomic result,
coming from mechanisms that are not observable by any particular firm.
Substituting (3.5) into the production function, we obtain the actual
production per firm:
Qt =
M  HSt 1
N P et
,
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so that aggregate real output in the economy is:
Yt =
M  HSt 1
 P et
. (3.6)
As in the case of employment, aggregate output negatively depends
on expected price. Even though exaggerated due to the simplicity of the
model, this macroeconomic result is consistent with empirical evidence
that price in fact is countercyclical (Kydland and Prescott, 1982).
Another observation is that output in this simple model does not
depend on capital. The root of this result is the absence of interest rate
and firms not deciding over investments. Treating available capital as
constant, firms choose the amount of labor that equates marginal labor
productivity with real wage. And since both marginal productivity and
wage directly depend on capital, capital cancels out when computing
actual output. This, however, is also consistent with the empirical
observation that output has insignificant correlation with capital over
the business cycle (Kydland and Prescott, 1982).
Note that since St 1 is a function of past and expected prices as
shown in the next section, price level is the only source of dynamics in
this model.
3.3 Households and Savings
We will ignore the labor supply decision for now3 and focus on the
consumption-savings decision. For simplicity, we assume that house-
holds use logarithmic utility function to value current real consumption
and real savings expressed in expected purchasing power next period.
As we show in section 3.6, this simplifying assumption does neither
affect nor cause the main features and results of the model, which
are also valid under the most generic Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aver-
sion (HARA) utility function (algebra becomes cumbersome though).
3As we have already assumed, labor supply always exceeds demand. Since the
wage is also determined through firms’ decisions and nominal constraint (3.1), we
only need labor supply to calculate the unemployment rate for illustrative purposes,
and it does not have any effect on the dynamics of the economy in this model.
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Therefore, household’s maximization problem4 in period t becomes:
max
St
⇢
ln
✓
It   St
Pt
◆
+   ln
✓
St
P et+1
+ C
◆ 
. (3.7)
Here It and St are nominal income and savings of each household
in period t; 0 <    1 is the weight of the savings part in the utility, so
that the weight on the consumption part is normalized to be 1;   can
also be seen as a subjective rate of time preference. C > 0 is a constant
required to reduce marginal utility of savings; naturally, households
expect to earn some income next period, that would bring marginal
utility of savings down, but for simplicity we avoid modeling income
expectations explicitly. Taking first order condition and solving for St,
we obtain:
St =
 
1 +  
It   C
1 +  
P et+1. (3.8)
Nominal savings depend positively on current nominal income, but
negatively on expected price level next period. So, with simple loga-
rithmic utility, only the substitution effect is at work, while the income
effect of expected relative price change is absent. Indeed, a household
saves more as expected real interest rate5, i.e. PtP et+1   1, increases.
6 As
shown in section 3.6, in case of HARA utility function, both effects are
explicitly present in the savings function, and the substitution effect
4It is further assumed that utility function is specified and being maximized at
the household level. While it is a rather unconventional approach, it may represent
reality better, since members of a household are expected to care about each other
and derive utility from making others feel better. For example, members that are able
to work, when deciding on their labor supply, will think not only about their own
trade-off between utility of higher consumption and disutility of effort, but also of the
fact that they have to take care of other members of their households that are unable
to work. Similarly, those who are staying at home obtain utility from other members
spending more time with them instead of working. Even though we have not proven it
formally, we believe that one utility function may better represent this complicated set
of synergies than the sum of individual utility functions.
5Remember that there is no contracted nominal interest rate in the model. Still,
following Grandmont (1985), decrease in future price can be seen as real income, as
if households were paid a real interest rate (which can, obviously, also be negative if
price level increases).
6Some empirical evidence for this can be found, for example, in the overview by
Elmendorf (1996).
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needs not necessarily dominate the income effect any more. However,
as mentioned already, this does not affect the main findings of the paper.
3.4 Equilibrium Price Level and Output
In the model described above, expected price level determines output,
which in turn determines actual price through the quantity equation of
money. Note that the nominal income of each household is predeter-
mined to be It = MH . Substituting it in (3.8), putting the result in (3.6),
and finally combining it with the quantity equation of money, we get
the actual law of motion for price:
Pt =
M
Yt
=
 M
M  HSt 1P
e
t
=
 M(1 +  )
M +HCP et
P et . (3.9)
Let us define equilibrium in the model as the state in which the price
level and output reach some fixed values P ⇤ and Y ⇤ and stay constant
over time. Then it should also be the case that economic agents form
correct expectations P e⇤ = P ⇤; if this was not the case, agents would
adjust their expectations for the next period causing the price not being
constant over time.
Call D(P et ) =
 M(1+ )
M+HCP et
the price expectation multiplier, which itself
is a decreasing function of P et . It is straightforward to see that when
D is greater than 1, economic agents underpredict price; when D < 1,
they overpredict the price; finally, when D = 1, economic agents form
correct expectations of price.7
After substituting P ⇤ in (3.9) instead of all price variables, it is
straightforward to see that equilibrium price in the model would be that
satisfyingD(P ⇤) = 1. Indeed, this condition guarantees that agents form
correct expectations, and because of that, following a widely accepted
7The careful reader might have already noted that an economically less relevant
case of equilibrium is that with P e⇤ = P ⇤ = 0.
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terminology, this equilibrium can be characterized as the Rational Ex-
pectations Equilibrium (REE). Still, note that our model in general is not
built on the assumption of rational expectations. Solving for equilibrium
price yields:
P ⇤ =
M( (1 +  )  1)
HC
. (3.10)
So, the equilibrium price is proportional to money stock: any change
in money stock would cause exactly the same percentage change in
the equilibrium price level. Now we can also compute the equilibrium
output in the economy:
Y ⇤ =
HC
 (1 +  )  1 . (3.11)
A first important observation from (3.11) is that equilibrium output
is independent from the money stock. This is consistent with the main-
stream view that monetary policy has no real effect and results only
in inflation in the long run. Still, there could be room for stabilizing
monetary policy in the short run, and this question will be extensively
analyzed later. A second observation is that equilibrium output is pro-
portional to population, so that if population growth were introduced, it
would cause equilibrium output to grow at the same pace. Even though
we are leaving economic growth out of analysis for now, this observation
is very important for a sanity check.
3.5 Possibility of Fluctuations
The possibility of fluctuations driven by adaptive learning and expecta-
tions arises from the fact that the actual law of motion (ALM) function
(3.9) is nonlinear in expected price. The intuitive explanation goes as
follows. Economic agents know neither the ALM nor the equilibrium
values of price and output. Moreover, as shown above, they always over-
estimate (underestimate) future prices when they are higher (lower)
than P ⇤. The existence of expectation errors causes them to learn, i.e. to
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update their tools used for forecasting to get more precise predictions.
If, for example, agents keep overpredicting price for a while, they
will eventually revise their forecasting tool to generate lower predictions,
and vice versa. However, as they approach equilibrium from either side,
not knowing what the equilibrium level is, they need not necessarily stop
there and may enter a zone where the sign of forecast errors reverses.
After that, agents start to revise their expectation tool in the opposite
direction, and so on and so forth. Cycles that thereby arise remind those
in Pigou’s opening quotation: errors of optimism alternate with errors
of pessimism. Note that these cycles need not necessarily be decaying.
Conducted simulations show that they may in fact diverge, depending
on the model fundamentals and learning rules, as shown in chapter 4.
It is also important to mention that it need not necessarily be the
case that agents do not know where the equilibrium is. It is sufficient
that they perceive themselves to be too small to affect market price and
that they are unable to cooperate to reach the equilibrium together. If
they realize that equilibrium is not going to happen, they simply want
to get the most precise forecast of future price to plan production and
savings.
3.6 Model with Hyperbolic Utility Function
In this section we show that the main results of the model preserve when
we assume that households use the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion
(HARA) utility function, and therefore do not rely on the simplifying
assumption of logarithmic utility. The uninterested reader may proceed
directly to chapter 4.
Analyzing the model with HARA utility function is, in fact, just one
step short of a generic analysis, which is outside the scope of this thesis
and left for future work. The HARA utility function presented in its
standard form
U(W ) =
1   
 
✓
↵W
1    + b
◆ 
; ↵ > 0,
↵W
1    + b > 0 (3.12)
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nests almost all special cases used in the literature: linear utility when
  = 1; quadratic utility when   = 2; constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) exponential utility function if b = 1 and   !  1; and power
utility function if   < 1 and ↵ = 1    , which in turn nests constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function (b = 0) and logarithmic
utility (  ! 0). 8
Preserving the assumptions from section 3.3 that households only
optimize over two periods and do not forecast their incomes, household’s
maximization problem with HARA utility function becomes:
max
St
⇢
1   
 
✓
↵(It   St)
(1   )Pt + bc
◆ 
+  
1   
 
✓
↵St
(1   )P et+1
+ bs
◆  
.
(3.13)
Analogously to the simple case with logarithmic utility, we claim that
it should be the case that bs > bc when   < 1, and bs < bc when   > 1,
as, given all other parameters of utility items equal, we should account
for the fact that households will receive income in period t+ 1, so that
marginal utility from future consumption of current savings should be
adjusted downwards. Taking the first order condition and solving for
savings, we obtain:
St =
 
1
1   It +
(1  )
↵

bc 
1
1  Pt   bs
⇣
P et+1
Pt
⌘  
1  
P et+1
 
⇣
P et+1
Pt
⌘  
1  
+  
1
1  
. (3.14)
Let us have a close look at equation (3.14). It simplifies exactly to
(3.8) when ↵ = 1    ,   ! 0, and bc = 0. Next, we will eliminate
these specific parameter restrictions one by one and see what new
characteristics each of them brings to the savings function.
First, if we make bc 6= 0, current price Pt will start having effect on
savings. So that savings now depend not only on expected inflation, but
also on observed one. If bs > bc > 0, then savings positively depend
on current price level and negatively on expected inflation, i.e. the
8An overview of utility functions can be found in many textbooks on financial
economics, e.g. in Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2004)
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substitution effect is at work. Indeed, in this case savings correlate
positively with expected real interest rate PtP et+1   1. If, on the other hand,
bc < bs < 0, then only the income effect plays a role.
Secondly, eliminating the condition of   ! 0 leads to the savings
function becoming nonlinear in prices. Whether savings depend posi-
tively or negatively on current and expected prices is now ambiguous.
We postpone thorough analysis of this issue until we get to the ALM func-
tion. Finally, easing ↵ = 1    further adjusts the impact of prices in the
numerator of (3.14), even though it appears to be the least important
effect.
As before, we obtain the actual law of motion of price by substituting
(3.14) into (3.6), and combining the resulting equation for output with
the quantity equation of money:
Pt =
 M
✓⇣
P et
Pt 1
⌘  
1  
+  
1
1  
◆
M
⇣
P et
Pt 1
⌘  
1  
+H (1  )↵

bs
⇣
P et
Pt 1
⌘  
1  
P et   bc 
1
1  Pt 1
 P et , (3.15)
where the price expectation multiplier D(Pt 1, P et ) can be defined as the
fraction in front of P et .
The derivation of equilibrium price and output is analogous to that
in section 3.4: for equilibrium price to be consistent with learning and
expectations formation, it should be the case that D(P ⇤, P ⇤) = 1. The
obtained equations are:
P ⇤ =
↵M
⇣
  +   
1
1     1
⌘
H(1   )
⇣
bs   bc  11  
⌘ , (3.16)
Y ⇤ =
H(1   )
⇣
bs   bc  11  
⌘
↵
⇣
  +   
1
1     1
⌘ . (3.17)
Even though equations (3.16) and (3.17) are a bit more complicated
than (3.10) and (3.11), they preserve the most important messages
of the latter. Firstly, equilibrium price is proportional to money stock
M . And secondly, equilibrium output is proportional to population and
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independent from the money stock, so that money stock is still neutral
in the long run.
Having said that, it is now important to make several comments
about the possibility of cycles in this setting. As discussed in section 3.5,
cycles may emerge because of nonlinearity of the actual law of motion,
particularly from the fact that agents always overestimate (underesti-
mate) future prices when they are higher (lower) than P ⇤. So that, in
Pigou’s terms, errors of optimism will be forced to turn into errors of
pessimism, and vice versa.
Therefore, the necessary condition for fluctuations to emerge is that
the price expectation multiplier D should be lower than 1 when prices
are higher than equilibrium level and greater than 1 when prices are
below the equilibrium. In fact, this is also a sufficient condition for
the equilibrium to be stable, as if that was not the case, the economy
would theoretically either shrink or diverge. Note, however, that this
condition is not sufficient to observe cycles; whether fluctuations will
actually emerge a great deal depends on how agents learn and form
their expectations. We address this question in chapter 4.
However, what is not clear from the above paragraph is which prices
should be compared with equilibrium level: expectation P et or previous
realization Pt 1? A somewhat inaccurate, but very simplifying and
intuitive answer would be both. When what might be called the “general
level of prices”, i.e. both realized and expected prices, is high, then
obviously D should be smaller than 1, and vice versa.
What complicates this simplistic view is that D(Pt 1, P et ) is nonlinear
in both prices. It may well happen also that while realized price from
the previous period is still above (below) P ⇤, expected price falls below
(above) the equilibrium level. Moreover, the analysis is greatly compli-
cated also by the fact that the ratio of prices matters: the sensitivity
of D to P et , for example, will a great deal depend on Pt 1. A quick
look at the first derivatives D0Pt 1 and D
0
P et
obtained in Mathematica
confirms that further formal analysis would be an extremely challenging
task taking a lot of time and paper space, so we decided to leave it
of out of the scope of this thesis. The rationale behind this decision
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is best expressed by Willem Buiter’s words: “a privately and socially
costly waste of time and other resources” (Buiter, 2009). Indeed, taking
into account the simplicity of the underlying assumptions of our model,
there is no much value added, if any, from deriving very precise and
cumbersome requirements for parameters in particular functional forms,
except, maybe, demonstrating our strong mastery of algebra.
We proceed instead, just to give an example, with a fairly simple
and intuitive case, in which we can reduce the analysis of behavior of
the function of two variables to a single-variable function. In particular,
let us assume that agents have a very short memory and always expect
that currently observed price will be the same next period, i.e. P et =
Pt 1 = Pt. Then the “general level of prices” mentioned above becomes
a single variable. However, we should bring the reader’s attention to
the fact that this simplification leads to the omission of the impact of
expected real interest rate, or expected relative price change, on the
savings decision. Expected real interest rate under this assumption is
simply always 0. Having said that, let us have a look at the resulting
equation for the price expectation multiplier:
D(Pt) =
 M
⇣
1 +  
1
1  
⌘
M +H (1  )↵
⇣
bs   bc  11  
⌘
Pt
(3.18)
Since this function should be decreasing in Pt for equilibrium to be
stable and to allow fluctuations to emerge theoretically,9 it should hold
that (1  )↵
⇣
bs   bc  11  
⌘
> 0, which is equivalent to C > 0 in the simple
case with logarithmic utility. Given that ↵ > 0, it translates into the
requirement that (i) bs > bc 
1
1   when   < 1, and (ii) bs < bc 
1
1   when
  > 1.
9In fact, as will be discussed in chapter 4, fluctuations will not emerge if expectations
are formed using an AR(1) model, which is exactly the case here.
Chapter 4
SIMULATION RESULTS
4.1 Economic Agents as Rational Econometri-
cians
In the previous chapter we have described the general setup of our
model, i.e. how the economy works and responds to actions of firms
and households, in particular to changes in their expectations. Now it is
time to say something about how these expectations are formed.
One of our aims was to make agents behave more realistically than
in the DSGE models. On the other hand we did not want to engage
into incorporating various documented behavioral patterns in the model
since (i) it is hard to distinguish which of them are the most important
for economic fluctuations and (ii) there is also a risk of ending up with
a very cumbersome model where it is not crystal clear how results are
obtained. While acknowledging that the incorporation of findings from
behavioral economics could become a very powerful strand of research
and future work, we instead decided to maintain the assumption of
rational economic agents, but to make their rationality bounded.
Among the variety of possible ways to introduce bounded rational-
ity, we found the approach described by Thomas Sargent in his book
Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics (1993) to be the most promising.
Rather than knowing the whole underlying model of the economy, i.e.
the actual law of motion, forming correct mathematical expectations of
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future outcomes which may not come true only because of exogenous
shocks, and solving infinite horizon inter-temporal optimization prob-
lems, as usually the inhabitants of DSGE models do, boundedly rational
agents instead are only left with the possibility to observe available
economic data, treat it rationally, produce forecasts over finite horizons,
and, therefore, solve limited optimization problems. Based on this de-
scription Sargent has developed a type of agents which he himself called
‘rational econometricians’.
The idea is that agents should deal with available data as econome-
tricians would: try to build and estimate as good an econometric model
as possible. While Sargent goes further in his book and discusses how
e.g. AI could be used for this purpose, we stick to the simplest cases.
Essentially, agents in our simulations estimate pre-specified econometric
models using available data, make forecasts based on those models, and
make economic decisions as described in chapter 3. This approach is
also often referred to in the literature as adaptive learning, even though
the latter one is a broader concept.
It is important to notice that while Sargent and the bulk of literature1
on adaptive learning and expectations usually study models and attempt
to find the conditions under which adaptive learning converges to ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium (REE), we consider adaptive learning as a
source of potential instability in our setting.
Let us now turn directly to the simulations.
4.2 Auto ARIMA in the Simple Logarithmic
Utility Case
In what follows we assume that economic agents try to model price as
a time series without considering the possibility that other economic
variables may be useful in forecasting it. A short discussion is needed
here. On the one hand this assumption can be justified by the fact
that, by design, all variables in the model are functions of realized and
1see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001)
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expected price, and therefore there is no mechanical causality from e.g.
unemployment rate to future price. On the other hand, if observed
economic variables affect price expectations of economic agents, they
effectively impact the actual price realizations. Moreover, observing
the co-movements in various economic variables may help firms and
households to learn faster how the economy works, and make the system
more stable. A larger number of variables can also cause confusion and
become an additional source of instability. In short, the consequences of
relaxing the above-mentioned assumption are ambiguous and depend
on the particular learning tool that agents use.
We start with probably the most interesting and, at the same time,
hardest to study formally learning tool: Auto ARIMA model. The idea
is that every period agents select the best (according to some chosen
criterion) ARIMA model based on the available price data and use it for
forecasting. In this way we allow agents not only to update the coeffi-
cients in their econometric model, but to change model specification as
well. Once again, this may either make the learning process faster and
the economy more stable, or become an additional source of instability.
Also, switching models in favor of seemingly better ones may actually
not be far from real life behavior.
To conduct the simulations we use R programming language. For
ARIMA model selection the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is
chosen and auto.arima() function from package forecast is used. Each
period, after the price expectation is formed and aggregate output Y is
determined, the latter is rounded to three digits after the decimal point
to prevent small and unobserved differences in the series to affect the
model selection. We take the logarithm of price data before feeding
them into auto.arima().2 The number of households and firms is 100
and 10 respectively, and money stock M equals 100. Technology A is
unity and does not change over time. We assume constant return to
scale so that ↵ +   = 1. Each simulation starts with the initial price
2There are two reasons for this: (i) taking the logarithm of prices prevents forecasts
from being negative; (ii) if agents take the first difference of logged price data (which
auto.arima() can suggest), then they will be working with inflation rates, and it makes
economic sense.
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expectation 1% above P ⇤, and then evolves as a purely deterministic
process, without any kind of exogenous shocks. After the very first
period agents have only one observation of price, which is therefore
their best guess for the second period, and which is exactly produced by
auto.arima(). But as more price data becomes available, agents build
more sophisticated ARIMA models.
A quite expectable question that may be asked by the careful reader
is whether the fact that we start our simulations off the equilibrium can
be seen as an external shock. Our view is that there is absolutely no
reason why agents should know and expect the equilibrium price level
at the “beginning of history.” If they are lucky enough to guess P ⇤ right
away, then indeed no fluctuations will emerge. But this situation is no
more likely than them starting at 1.01 · P ⇤ or at any other level.
Figure 4.1a plots the output Y 3 from a simulation with labor pro-
duction share   = 0.6 and subjective discount rate   = 0.7. All other
parameters are computed so that equilibrium output Y ⇤ equals 100 and
P ⇤ = 1. The vertical grey lines indicate points where agents switch
their models. The first and most important observation is that output in-
deed fluctuates around its equilibrium level (horizontal line). Secondly,
observed cycles are of varying length and amplitude: something that
economists usually fail to achieve in standard RBC models.
The amplitude of output peaks roughly in the middle of the plot,
when Y drops by around 4% of its equilibrium level. An interesting
fact is that it is preceded by several drastic revisions of the models: in
period 159 agents switch from ARMA(2,5) to AR(1); then, in period 160
they switch to ARMA(2,2); and in period 163 they choose ARMA(3,1),
which they maintain until the end of the simulation. This observation
may suggest an interesting hypothesis that major revisions of the agents’
beliefs about how the economy functions may cause economic crises.
Figure 4.1b demonstrates that cycles can be also diverging. With
  = 0.55 and   = 0.95, the amplitude of output fluctuations is constantly
increasing. Note that the frequency of switching between model specifi-
3The plot of prices always mirrors that of output because of the quantity equation
of money together with fixedM .
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(a)   = 0.6,   = 0.7
(b)   = 0.55,   = 0.95
Figure 4.1: Cycles in Simple Logarithmic Case
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cations is much higher here than on figure 4.1a. This supports the claim
that model switching may also be a serious source of instability.
It should be mentioned that in some cases of seemingly diverging
simulations, convergence towards equilibrium was observed in the long
run, while in other cases authors observed diverging oscillations with
any simulation horizon.4 Formal analysis of this issue is needed, and in
chapter 5 we will introduce a possible approach for future work on this
line.
4.3 Unemployment
It was assumed in the model setup that households’ labor supply does not
matter when employment, wage, production and prices are determined;
firms are always able to hire the required amount of labor and wage
is determined through labor demand and nominal constraint (3.1).
However, if we wanted to show the behavior of unemployment in our
model, it would not be sufficient to just show the actual employment,
as it reflects only firms decisions. It could well happen that households’
labor supply is not constant and varies as economic conditions change.
To obtain labor supply in the economy, we modify the household’s
maximization problem (3.7) to incorporate utility from leisure:5
max
St,lt
⇢
ln
✓
wtZlt + St 1   St
Pt
◆
+   ln
✓
St
P et+1
+ C
◆
+ µ ln (Z(1  lt))
 
.
(4.1)
Here Z is the size of one household, e.g. the number of people, lt
is the fraction of employed individuals in each household,6 and µ is a
coefficient representing the importance of leisure for households. In
(4.1) households perceive that they can increase their nominal income
4Though it was not proved that these indeed diverge forever.
5We continue with our assumption that utility being maximized at the household
level.
6For example, it would be a normal situation when a household of Z = 7 people
consists of 4 elders, 2 working-age persons and one child. Then one would expect
lt = 2/7 under normal economic conditions. lt can also be seen in a more traditional
way: as a fraction of the individual’s time allocated to work.
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Figure 4.2: Umeployment Rate: µ = 2.65
by working more through wtZlt, even though in the end employment is
decided by firms and households only decide over savings as in (3.7).
Taking first order conditions, solving for Zlt, and multiplying by the
number of households H, we obtain total labor supply in the economy:
LSt =
H
1 + µ+  
✓
Z(1 +  )  µSt 1 + CP
e
t+1
wt
◆
. (4.2)
Labor supply (i) is proportional to the number of households; (ii)
depends negatively on savings from the previous period, as households
have less incentive to increase their nominal income; (iii) depends neg-
atively on expected price next period, as it reflects the fact that house-
holds will be able to buy less for the same amount of labor provided;
(iv) depends positively on wage wt. Let us now turn to simulation.
Figure 4.2 plots the unemployment rate from the simulation with the
same parameters as on figure 4.1a in section 4.2. The black line shows
what the unemployment rate would be if households did not decide on
how much labor they would like to supply, i.e. LS is constant at its equi-
40 CHAPTER 4. SIMULATION RESULTS
librium level; while the red line shows the behavior of unemployment
taking into account changes in labor supply. What we see on the plot,
namely that the red line is more volatile than the black one, proves the
hypothesis that changes in labor demand from firms tell only half of
the story, and that the actual unemployment rate is more volatile, since
households are willing to work more during recessions and less during
economic booms.
It is worth mentioning also that the effect of labor supply may be
understated in the above simulation due to the fact that we use loga-
rithmic utility, which is usually associated with “myopish” behavior. We
suspect that actual unemployment may be even more volatile in alter-
native utility specifications, and studying unemployment under generic
functional forms is worth effort in the future.
4.4 Multivariate Models
It was mentioned in section 4.2 that allowing agents to build multivariate
models for predicting price has ambiguous consequences. In this section
we quickly sketch the preliminary results from simulations with agents
using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models.
In the following simulations we added wage as the additional vari-
able. As estimating VAR models requires having some dataset already, in
the first half of the simulations data is generated with the auto.arima()
function as in section 4.2, and then agents switch to VAR. We use the
package vars in R. In every period, the function VARselect() is used to
choose the order of VAR model, and then the function VAR() is used
to estimate the value of the parameters of the model. As before, we
take the logarithm of price and wage data before feeding them into the
VAR model to prevent the generation of negative forecasts in the case of
diverging cycles. Figure 4.3 shows examples of obtained simulations.
Switching to VAR models turned out to be extremely destabilizing
in our simulations. Even though there were cases when, following a
quickly converging to equilibrium Auto ARIMA data generating process,
the VAR part exhibited negligible fluctuations around the equilibrium,
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(a)   = 0.55,   = 0.9
(b)   = 0.6,   = 0.95
Figure 4.3: Cycles with Agents Using VAR Models
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as shown on figure 4.3a, the overwhelming majority of simulations
resulted in rapidly diverging output once agents switch to VAR. Figure
4.3b shows a typical simulation. The last few cycles have such a large
amplitude that all the previous fluctuations are hardly distinguishable
from the equilibrium line; also, after period 300 the function VARselect()
reported an error, as no suitable VAR model could be found any more.
Needless to say that the above result has to be treated with caution,
however, as it is obtained with the simplest simulations imaginable. It is
based on the assumptions that agents know only reduced-form modeling,
and are not able to develop “good” structural economic models.
4.5 Simulation with HARA Utility
It was shown in section 3.6 that the obtained results hold theoretically
when we switch from the simplifying assumption of logarithmic utility
to more generic utility functions, in particular Hyperbolic Absolute Risk
Aversion (HARA) utility.
Figure 4.4 shows that we can obtain both converging (figure 4.4a)
and diverging (figure 4.4b) cycles when the parameters of the HARA
utility function are selected so that it does not simplify to one of the
popular utility function types. As before, we assume that agents use
Auto ARIMA. Constant return to scale is assumed, and the parameter bs
is computed so that P ⇤ = 1 and Y ⇤ = 100.
On both figure 4.4a and 4.4b we can see that the amplitude of fluctu-
ations increases when the frequency of model switching increases. This
is more evidence in support of the hypothesis that revisions by agents of
their beliefs about how the economy works may trigger instability.
4.6 AR(2) and “False Equilibria”
All previous simulations were based on models with changing specifica-
tions, and therefore are very hard to study formally. Here we consider a
simpler case when agents have a pre-specified model and only update
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(a)   = 0.6,   = 0.85, bc = 0.03,
  =  0.4, ↵ = 2
(b)   = 0.6,   = 0.8, bc = 0.2,
  =  1, ↵ = 1
Figure 4.4: Cycles with Agents Having HARA Utility
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parameters over time. Two things motivate us for this exercise. Firstly,
it is itself value-adding to show that cycles can emerge and proliferate
in the economy even if agents do not switch model specification; model
switching is then considered only as an additional source of instability.
Secondly, sticking to one particular model specification opens the pos-
sibility of formal analysis of how economy behaves in the long run, in
particular whether it diverges or not. More analysis of this question will
follow in chapter 5.
Our choice of the specification to study is the AR(2) model. It is
fairly simple, yet yields business cycles and shows some unexpected and
interesting behavior. Also, it seems to be the case that for fluctuations
to emerge, one of the fundamental economic variables (most often
output) should follow an autoregressive process at least of order 2.
This is essentially achieved when agents use AR(2); all the simulations
with them using AR(1) resulted in price level and output smoothly
converging to their equilibrium levels. It is very interesting and worth
noting that two of the most popular models of business cycles, the
Multiplier-Accelerator model by P. Samuelson and the RBC model by
Kydland and Prescott, in different ways yield equations in which output
depends on its values in the previous 2 periods, essentially following an
AR(2) process.
Figure 4.5 shows the simulation with   = 0.7 and   = 0.45, in which
agents estimate the following AR(2) model:
Pt =  0 +  1Pt 1 +  2Pt 2, (4.3)
with the initial values of parameters  0 = 0.5,  1 = 1.6, and  2 =  1.
These parameters are used in the first 5 periods, and after that, agents
start to update them. Additionally, we introduce memory of length 300.
This means that agents never use more than the 300 most recent price
observations to estimate the parameters of their model.
Quite expectedly, output in the simulation exhibits cyclical fluctua-
tions. However, as we can see, in the first 500 periods or so, it fluctuates
not around its equilibrium level, but way below it, and only after cy-
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Figure 4.5: AR(2) Model with Memory and “False Equilibria”:   = 0.7,
  = 0.45
cles almost die out, it starts to fluctuate once again, even with higher
amplitude than before, this time around a value much closer to the equi-
librium level. What happens here is that memory comes to play its role,
and when instability at the beginning of the simulation is “forgotten”,
agents suddenly realize that they are far off the equilibrium.
However, if memory was not introduced, this second wave of cycles
would never emerge, and output instead would follow the light-gray
line, extremely slowly converging toward the equilibrium.7 The speed
of convergence in this second case is so slow, that one can say that
the economy is stuck in a “false equilibrium”.8 This notion very much
reminds of Keynes’s belief that the economy may end up being in a
depressed state for a surprisingly long time, and therefore active gov-
ernment intervention is needed to “cheer up” the animal spirits. In our
7This happens due to the fact that in this case the expectation multiplier D(P et ) is
only marginally different from unity.
8Even though this is not an equilibrium technically speaking, and, of course, not an
exactly constant value over time.
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simulation the animal spirits were enlivened by short memory.
Chapter 5
EXPECTATIONAL STABILITY
In this chapter we present and attempt the application of some standard
methods for the analysis of the limiting behavior of stochastic systems
with adaptive learning.1 This is a highly technical part, the main purpose
of which is to build a solid basis for future analysis; the uninterested
reader may proceed directly to chapter 6.
Instead, for further examination of the methods introduced in this
chapter, the excited reader can refer to Sargent (1993), as well as to
Evans and Honkapohja (2001, 2009).
5.1 Learning as a Recursive Algorithm
In the course of this chapter, unless otherwise specified, we only consider
the version of our model in which households have logarithmic utility.
Moreover, we proceed by assuming that agents use an AR(2) model to
forecast future prices based on past observations. This choice is justified
by the fact that this model provides an effective trade-off between
simplicity and usability.2 In other words, our assumption is that the
perceived law of motion (PLM) is AR(2), so that agents form their
1Please note that in fact we are going to apply these methods to a deterministic
system.
2On the one hand, the simplicity of an AR(1) model does not allow for the fluctua-
tions to arise, making this case uninteresting from an economic perspective. On the
other hand, auto ARIMA or VAR models have rather complex dynamics, making their
formal analysis an extremely challenging task.
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expectations fitting the following process:
Pt =  0 +  1Pt 1 +  2Pt 2 + "t,
where "t is an i.i.d. error term with zero mean. As an immediate result,
we observe that
P et =  0 +  1Pt 1 +  2Pt 2.
Combining (3.9) with (5.1) we obtain the ALM as a function of
observed prices:
Pt =
 M(1 +  )( 0 +  1Pt 1 +  2Pt 2)
M +HC( 0 +  1Pt 1 +  2Pt 2)
. (5.1)
Given a set of starting values  0, 1, 2 and observations Pi with
i = 1, 2, ..., t, it is possible to express the learning process (i.e. the
dynamics of  0, 1, 2) over time by using the recursive least squares
(RLS) algorithm. The result is the following system of two equations:
 t =  t 1 + t 1R 1t pt 1(Pt   p>t 1 t 1) (5.2)
Rt = Rt 1 + t 1(pt 1p
>
t 1  Rt 1) (5.3)
where pt := (1, Pt, Pt 1)>,  t := ( 0t , 1t , 2t)> and Rt is the moment
matrix for pt using observations Pi with i = 1, ..., t. From (5.1), note
that in fact Pt is a function of the previous period parameters  t 1
and observations pt 1; that is, Pt := f( t 1,pt 1). Using this result
in (5.2), defining St 1 := Rt and moving (5.3) one period ahead, we
obtain:
 t =  t 1 + t 1S 1t 1pt 1(f( t 1,pt 1)  p>t 1 t 1) (5.4)
St = St 1 + t 1
✓
t
t+ 1
◆
(ptp
>
t   St 1). (5.5)
Formally, the system (5.4)-(5.5) is a recursive algorithm fully de-
scribing agents’ learning dynamics at any time in the future, for given
initial values. Our aim is now to investigate if and how it is possible to
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use this system to understand the asymptotic properties of our model.
5.2 Theory of Stochastic Approximation
Consider a (stochastic) recursive algorithm of the form
✓t = ✓t 1 +  tQ(t,✓t 1,xt(✓t 1)), (5.6)
where ✓t is the vector of parameter estimates, xt is the vector of obser-
vations, and  t is a deterministic sequence of gains.
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), we know that it is possible
to study the limiting behavior of any recursive algorithm in the form of
(5.6), by analyzing its associated ordinary differential equation (ODE).
The latter is defined as
d✓
d⌧
= h(✓(⌧)), (5.7)
where h(✓) is given by
h(✓) = lim
t!1
E [Q(t,✓, x¯(✓))] , (5.8)
with E[·] denoting the mathematical expectation operator and x¯(✓)
being the value of xt obtained by holding ✓t fixed at its limiting value,
i.e. ✓t = ✓.
Most importantly, from stochastic approximation results,3 it is possi-
ble to establish a direct correspondence between possible limiting points
of the recursive algorithm, and locally stable equilibria of the ODE (5.7).
3cf. Marcet and Sargent (1989)
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5.3 An Application to Our Setting
Let us attempt an application of this result to our case. First of all, note
that the system (5.4)-(5.5) is indeed in the form of (5.6) with
✓t = vec( t St)
xt = (1, Pt, Pt 1, Pt 2)>
 t = t
 1.
Therefore, we can use (5.4)-(5.5) to retrieve the explicit form of
Q(·), so to study its properties. For simplicity we split the function into
two components as follows:
Q (t,✓, x¯) = S
 1p¯(f( , p¯)  p¯> ) (5.9)
QS(t,✓, x¯) =
✓
t
t+ 1
◆
(p¯p¯>   S). (5.10)
We can now use (5.9) and (5.10) to find the ODEs associated to the
system (5.4) - (5.5):
h ( ) = lim
t!1
E

S 1p¯
✓
 M(1 +  )(p¯> )
M +HC(p¯> )
  p¯> 
◆ 
(5.11)
hS(S) = lim
t!1
E

t
t+ 1
(p¯p¯>   S)
 
. (5.12)
First, it is important to observe that in our case everything inside the
expectation operator is deterministic. That is, there is no stochastic part
that might prevent us from taking expectations of each single component
separately.
Second, let us call pˆ := (1, Pˆ , Pˆ )> the mathematical expectation of
p¯. Note that either pˆ = (1, P ⇤, P ⇤)> or pˆ = (1, 0, 0)> because for any
other value of pˆ a fixed   would not be sustainable, since the learning
process would cause it to change. Therefore, it is not rational to expect
any value of pˆ other than those two.
Furthermore, defining W := E[p¯p¯>] = pˆpˆ>, it is easy to see that
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(5.12) becomes
hS(S) =W   S,
implying the first condition for equilibria of the ODE to be W = S.
Replacing this result in (5.11) and solving, we obtain
h ( ) =  
✓
 M(1 +  )
M +HC(pˆ> )
  1
◆
. (5.13)
This is the core ODE defining possible limiting points of our recursive
algorithm (5.4)-(5.5).
Even though formally we should speak of equilibria of the ODE in
terms of  , it is more illustrative to present them in terms of P e. In fact,
we can see that (5.13) has two equilibria in terms of P e. The first one
corresponds to the solution of
 M(1 +  )
M +HC(pˆ> )
  1 = 0
and that is P e = P ⇤, while the second one corresponds to   = 0 and
implies P e = 0.4 Interestingly enough, we will see that the second equi-
librium can be disregarded since it is locally unstable for any meaningful
choice of parameters.
However, before moving to the determination of local stability, it is
interesting to note that the analysis of (5.13) is indeed greatly compli-
cated by the nonlinearity of the ALM.5 Intuitively, this seems to be a
further confirmation of the importance of this factor in our model for
the provision of adequate dynamics for the generation of cycles. That
is, non-linearities seem to play an important role in the functioning of
the economy, suggesting that heavy reliance on linear approximations
might cause a loss of important features of the economic system.
To investigate the stability of these fixed points, we derive the Jaco-
4Note that indeed these equilibria correspond to the two points that were identified
in chapter 3. Furthermore, please note also that technically there is an infinite number
of equilibria identifiable in terms of  .
5cf. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for cases with linear ALM.
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bian matrix of the function on the right-hand side of (5.13). Defining
A :=  M(1+ )M+HC(pˆ> ) and B :=
 HC
M+HC(pˆ> ) , it is possible to express the
Jacobian as
J =
0BB@(A  1) + (AB) 0 (ABPˆ ) 0 (ABPˆ ) 0(AB) 1 (A  1) + (ABPˆ ) 1 (ABPˆ ) 1
(AB) 2 (ABPˆ ) 2 (A  1) + (ABPˆ ) 2
1CCA ,
where either Pˆ = P ⇤ or Pˆ = 0.
From fundamental results on the stability of ODEs, we know that if
all the eigenvalues of J evaluated at a fixed point have negative real
parts, then that fixed point is locally asymptotically stable. Instead, if
at least one eigenvalue of J evaluated at a fixed point has positive real
part, then that fixed point is locally asymptotically unstable.
Finally, let us define K := J    I, where   is a 1⇥ 3 vector and I is
the 3 ⇥ 3 identity matrix. To obtain the eigenvalues of J , we need to
solve det(K) = 0.
5.4 Convergence for the Case of   = 0
We are now going to consider local stability of the equilibrium of (5.13)
characterized by   = 0. As already mentioned, this case can also be
expressed as P e = P = 0.
Other than a simple example, this analysis is relevant in that a credi-
ble economic model can afford neither to allow its agents to expect a
zero price nor certainly to permit the economy to actually reach that
level; even more so considering that in the latter case production would
be infinite. That is to say, even if in reality it might be a desirable situa-
tion, we certainly do not want to model an economy where production
can be infinite and everything can be free of charge.
First of all, let us note that in this case the matrix K is greatly
simplified by the fact that  0 =  1 =  2 = 0. Let us call K0 the matrix
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resulting from such a simplification of K. Then,
K0 =
0BB@[ (1 +  )  1]    0 00 [ (1 +  )  1]    0
0 0 [ (1 +  )  1]   
1CCA ,
implying that J has only one eigenvalue with multiplicity 3, i.e.  1 =
 2 =  3 =  (1 +  )  1. Thus, the condition for P e = P = 0 to be locally
asymptotically stable becomes:
 (1 +  )  1 < 0
  <
1
1 +  
.
However, by looking at (3.10) it is easy to note that for this condition
to be verified, the equilibrium price P ⇤ has to be negative.6 This, in
turn, implies that for any positive equilibrium price P ⇤, the economy
will never converge to the fixed point with   = 0 and P e = P = 0 unless
it starts from it, which is clearly never the case in our setting. That is,
for any reasonable set of parameters, our economy will never converge
to an economically meaningless equilibrium solution.
One more conclusion that can be drawn from this result is that
pˆ = (1, P ⇤, P ⇤)> for all the relevant cases. In fact, if P ⇤ > 0 and the
economy does not start with   = 0, then we have just proved that it
will never converge to a point with P e = P = 0. Thus, one should not
mathematically expect it to do so.
5.5 Notes on Convergence for Pe = P ⇤ > 0
Even though the equilibrium of (5.13) characterized by P e = P ⇤ > 0
is more cumbersome to treat analytically, we can at least simplify the
matrix K in view of our latter result. In fact, by noting that we can use
(3.10) to substitute for P ⇤, and that in this case:
1) pˆ = (1, P ⇤, P ⇤)>,
6This is the case becauseM , H and C must all be positive to make economic sense.
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2) P e = P ⇤,
3) P ⇤ =  0 +  1P ⇤ +  2P ⇤,
one can obtain the following ‘simplified’ version of K:
KP ⇤ =
0BBBBBBB@
(a  1)(1   1    2)    (a 1)2ba (1   1    2) (a 1)
2
ba (1   1    2)
(ba) 1 (a  1) 1     (a  1) 1
(ba) 2 (a  1) 2 (a  1) 2    
1CCCCCCCA ,
with a := 1 (1+ ) and b =
 HC
M .
7
Having obtained KP ⇤, with some tedious algebra it is possible to
show that in this context the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are
given by the solutions of
 3    2(a  1) +  
⇣
(a  1) 1 2(a  1  ba)
⌘
 
⇣
(a  1)2(1   1    2) 1 2(a  1  ba)
⌘
= 0.
(5.14)
It is certainly possible to solve analytically (5.14) by using a standard
cubic formula. However, in view of the complexity of the solution, it
would be hard to make economic sense out of it.
A smarter approach would be to consider the case in which P ⇤ = 1,
exactly as we imposed in all simulations in chapter 4. Note that since
P ⇤ = a 1ba = 1, equation (5.14) simplifies to
 3    2(a  1) = 0, (5.15)
and it is now easy to see that the solutions of (5.15) are
 1 = (a  1)
 2 = 0.
7Please note that this implies P ⇤ = a 1ba .
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However, while  1 < 0 is indeed verified for all cases with P ⇤ > 0,8
the presence of a null eigenvalue complicates the analysis in the sense
that it would require us to consider at least terms of second-order (i.e.
the Hessian matrix) of (5.13) to formally identify the exact conditions
for stability, and therefore convergence.
In line with the exemplary and introductory role of this chapter we
decide not to follow that path. However, an interesting and powerful
approach that could be taken in future research is the application of
numerical methods in the attempt of shedding light on this kind of
mathematical problems.
8Obviously this is the case because we assume, as it should be done, thatM , H and
C are all positive.
Chapter 6
STABILIZING MONETARY
POLICY
A central banker comes into the caffe and orders a cake. The
waiter asks:
– Would you like it cut into 6 or 12 pieces?
The central banker replies:
– 6, please, I do not feel like eating 12.
In this chapter we will analyze the possibility of stabilizing monetary
policy in our simple model. As already noted, this model is characterized
by long-run money neutrality; i.e. any permanent increase inM would
lead to a proportional increase in the equilibrium price P ⇤ (see equations
(3.10) and (3.16)), leaving the equilibrium level of output Y ⇤ unaffected
(see equations (3.11) and (3.17)). Still, a possibility exists that shifts in
the money stock may affect output in the short-run, making stabilizing
monetary policy possible and the above joke not funny any more.
6.1 Monetary Policy with Simple Logarithmic
Utility
Let us first investigate whether monetary policy is effective in the setting
where households have a simple logarithmic utility function. To conduct
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this formal analysis, we change the previously constant money stockM
intoMt. The actual law of motion of price from (3.9) becomes:
Pt =
 Mt(1 +  )
Mt +HCP et
P et , (6.1)
while the ALM for output is:
Yt =
Mt
 (1 +  )P et
+
HC
 (1 +  )
. (6.2)
Looking at equation (6.2) as a function of time, it is straightforward
to note that it contains a fixed part and a variable part, with the latter
depending positively on the money stock Mt and negatively on price
expectation P et .
The immediate observation from equation (6.2) is that monetary
policy does not have any real effect even in the short run if economic
agents know exactly the upcoming change in the money stock and adjust
their initial price expectation by the same proportion; i.e. if they know
that the money stock is going to increase by x% next period and they
consequently increase their price expectation by exactly x%. It is easy
to see from (6.1) that in this case actual price will also increase by x%.
Even without any formal proof, it is intuitive to see therefore that such
behavior of agents is consistent with learning experience: if actual price
always responds to change in the money stock exactly as agents expect
it to, they have no reasons to change their beliefs.
In light of this result, there are only two cases in which short-term
stabilizing monetary policy can actually work in this model: (i) the
monetary policy is in part unexpected, i.e. agents do not know exactly
what money supply will be in the next period; (ii) agents believe that
changes in the money stock, for some reason, do not imply exactly the
same change in prices (at least in the short run). While the first case
belongs to a rather political discussion on transparency of central banks
and not much on it can be said here, we will have a closer look at the
second one.
Let us investigate what happens if agents believe that a x% change
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in the money stock does not cause a proportional shift in price level,
resulting instead in a percentage change of price equal to  · x%,  > 0.
This would imply that the derivative of price expectation with respect
to the money stock equals: @P
e
t
@Mt
=  P
e
t
Mt
. Furthermore, it is easy to verify
that the derivative of actual price with respect to the money stock is:
@Pt
@Mt
=  (1 +  )
M2t
@P et
@Mt
+HCP e2t
(M +HCP et )2
,
which, after substituting @P
e
t
@Mt
, becomes:
@Pt
@Mt
=  (1 +  )
 Mt +HCP et
(M +HCP et )2
P et . (6.3)
For the so called  -belief to be sustainable within an adaptive learn-
ing environment, it should be the case that actual price responds to
changes in the money stock also with the rate  , implying @Pt@Mt =  
Pt
Mt
=
 (1 +  )  M+HCP et
P et . However, It is straightforward to see that if  < 1
( > 1) the ‘responsiveness’ of actual price is greater (smaller) than  .
Therefore, any value of  other than unity is not sustainable from the
learning perspective, because at some point agents would realize that
their belief is not coming true and update it in the correct direction. The
question is, however, whether they will converge to  = 1 or end up
fluctuating around this value.
If they do converge, then the ultimate conclusion is that monetary
policy may initially have short-term real effects, but it will become inef-
fective in the longer perspective when (and if!) learning is completed.
On the other hand, as long as agents keep changing their beliefs
regarding  over time, stabilizing monetary policy will remain possible.
However, as  will be changing, the same will do the responsiveness of
price and output to monetary shocks according to (6.3). Therefore, even
assuming that a central bank knows exactly how the economy functions,
it would also need to know the market sentiment, i.e. what economic
agents expect from monetary policy, to operate effectively. Same shifts in
the money stock may have very different effects depending on economic
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situation.
6.2 Stabilizing Policy in a General Setting
The conclusions made in the previous section change even further in
favor of the effectiveness of monetary policy if we consider the actual
law of motion of output when agents use a more generic HARA utility
function:
Yt =
Mt
⇣
P et
Pt 1
⌘  
1  
+H (1  )↵

bs
⇣
P et
Pt 1
⌘  
1  
P et   bc 
1
1  Pt 1
 
 P et
✓⇣
P et
Pt 1
⌘  
1  
+  
1
1  
◆ (6.4)
Indeed, now even if agents knew exactly the upcoming shift in money
stock and adjusted their expectations proportionally, these adjustments
simply would not cancel out as they did in (6.2). Therefore, monetary
interventions will always have real effects on the economy!
However, central bankers should refrain from celebrating too early.
In fact, only if they knew precisely how the economy works, knew the
exact values of all the coefficients in the model, and, moreover, knew
very well agents’ price expectations and how these expectations react
to news about monetary policy; in other words, if they were some kind
of economic gods, then indeed they would be able to conduct a very
effective stabilizing monetary policy.
There is no reason to believe, however, that central bankers know
significantly much more about the economy than economists at research
departments of large private companies and banks. After all, they
usually go to the same schools and study the same economic theories
and econometric methods. The hard truth is also that private institutions
usually offer higher salaries. To sum up, it is highly doubtful that central
banks can assess accurately the consequences of their own actions, and
therefore they should not abuse the power they have.
Having said that, we should cheer up our disillusioned central
bankers and tell them that monetary policy is not going to be thrown
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away. As someone has said, it is better to do something imperfectly than
do nothing perfectly. If the economy is obviously falling into a recession,
or is already in a crisis, monetary intervention will have a real (and
hopefully positive) effect, and therefore might be used. Not to mention
the situation of “false equilibrium” shown in section 4.6, in which case
monetary policy is one of the instruments able to move the economy
back on track.
Chapter 7
DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this concluding chapter we would like to quickly systemize our find-
ings and point out the most interesting and relevant directions for future
work. The contributions of this thesis largely belong to two major fields
of economics: business cycle theory and effectiveness of stabilizing mon-
etary policy. We will shortly describe our findings in a consecutive order,
discussing possible improvements and extensions on the way.
I.
With a simple, growth-less macroeconomic model, we show theo-
retically that business cycles can emerge endogenously in the economy
when agents do not have perfect foresight, learn adaptively to form ex-
pectations, and solve limited inter-temporal optimization models. This
possibility largely arises from the nonlinearity of the actual law of mo-
tion of price, in particular from the fact that agents always overpredict
(underpredict) future prices when they are higher (lower) than equi-
librium level. Even though the main version of the model is based on
households having simple logarithmic utility function, we also show that
our results hold when a more generic Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion
utility function is chosen. Interestingly enough, Money stock is neutral
in the long run in either case.
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We see three ways in which our model should be developed further.
Firstly, we believe that the most important next step would be to aban-
don the use of particular functional forms for the utility and production
functions, and move to the analysis of a fully generic setting. A greater
degree of generality is preferable in that it would potentially allow the
derivation of necessary and sufficient conditions on the shape1 of the
utility and production functions for the emergence and proliferation of
cycles. This mighty task however, requires more time and maturity of
the research, and will appear in future publications.
Secondly, the model can be extended to become more realistic. In-
troducing growth, making agents forecast and optimize over longer
horizons, incorporating additional important economic variables such
as contracted interest rate, could all greatly enhance the usability of the
model, if done in a simple and elegant way.
The third thing that could be done is deriving the same results in
a completely alternative setting. Developing a “more standard, more
IS-LM’y, with-Philips-Curve’y” model2 could bring this line of research
to a qualitatively new level, perhaps even making its message accessible
to a more general public.
II.
We conduct simulations in models with agents having both simple
logarithmic and HARA utility functions. Following Sargent (1993), we
assume agents to be “rational econometricians” using various econo-
metric adaptive learning tools: Auto ARIMA, VAR and AR(2) models.
In all simulations, output and other economic variables indeed display
cyclical fluctuations around their equilibrium levels, without the intro-
duction of any kind of exogenous shocks to productivity or any other
fundamental parameters of the economy, in contrast to RBC models.
To our knowledge this thesis is the first attempt to formally introduce
1As opposed to deriving conditions on parameters, that often becomes cumbersome
when parametrization rises.
2A very valuable advice given by Prof. George Akerlof at the ISEO Summer School
2013, for which we are extremely grateful to him.
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adaptive learning and expectation errors as an autonomous source of
endogenous business cycles.
Both converging and diverging cycles may be obtained in simula-
tions with Auto ARIMA models, while the VAR learning tool leads to
diverging fluctuations in the majority of cases, suggesting that making
agents consider several variables increases instability, at least in our
setting. It is also observed that higher frequency of model switching is
usually accompanied with increasing amplitude of cycles, suggesting
the hypothesis that economic crises may happen when agents make
drastic revisions of their beliefs about how the economy works. Only
converging cycles could be obtained with AR(2), however in this case
the economy may get trapped in a so called “false equilibrium”, with
output way below or above the true equilibrium level. Even though this
is not formally an equilibrium, the convergence towards the true one
is so slow that exogenous shocks may be needed to move the economy
back on track. This result is in line with the Keynesian view that the
economy may remain in a depressed state for quite a long period of
time, and active government intervention may be required to speed up
the recovery.
However, in conducted simulations, the behavior of the economy has
proved very sensitive to the specified learning tools, initial conditions,
and parameters of the model. Therefore, more work should be done
in order to achieve a better understanding of how the dynamics of the
economy depend on all of these preconditions. Once again, generic
analysis would be of great help here.
A major extension would be to make agents build structural economic
models instead of using simple reduced-form modeling. This would
require developing AI and a “rational theorist” type of agents. This
direction for future research was also first outlined in Sargent (1993).
A promising idea for economic historians would be to check if major
economic perturbations can indeed be explained by significant revisions
in economic theory.
We believe there to be a major step between running simulations
and calibrating a model in order to reproduce real-world economic
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dynamics. In fact, not only the possibility of calibration would allow a
better evaluation of the empirical fit of our model, but it could also open
the possibility of using it for economic forecasting and policy analysis.
This, of course, can be done only when the above mentioned extensions
and improvements are already accomplished.
III.
Within the developed framework we analyze whether active mone-
tary policy (i.e. changes in money stock) can be used for stabilization
purposes. It turns out that in the simple case, when agents have loga-
rithmic utility function, shifts in money supply can have real effects on
the economy only if they are unexpected by agents, or if future price
expectations are not adjusted exactly proportionally to the announced
monetary interventions. We also show that the second case is not sus-
tainable within the adaptive learning environment, so that monetary
policy may become ineffective in the long run when, and if, learning is
complete.
We prove, however, that monetary interventions always have real
effects in the short run in the setting with a more generic HARA utility
function. Still, it is highly questionable whether the central bank is able
to accurately assess the consequences of its own actions, as that would
require it knowing precisely the actual law of motion of the economy,
current market’s expectations, and agents’ reaction to news about the
upcoming monetary interventions, which, moreover, can change over
time. In fact, there are no reasons to believe that central bankers are
systematically smarter than economists at private institutions.
Nevertheless, monetary policy might be an effective instrument to
move the economy back on track when it is entering a recession or stuck
in a crisis. Our point is rather that central banks should not abuse the
power they have and overdo what is required from them.
Furthermore, one might be worried whether monetary intervention,
while initially having a positive effect on output, would not cause more
economic instability and higher amplitude of business cycles later, when
agents start to revise their forecasting models in view of an increased
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difference between their expectations and actual outcomes. Simulations
of the consequences of shifts in money supply in a longer perspectives
might become an important practical application of our model in the
future. It would be an interesting exercise also to simulate a setting
in which the central bank is trying to learn the actual law of motion
and conduct stabilizing monetary policy, and compare the results with
simulations where the central bank is absent.
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